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ABSTRACT: I examine Henry More’s engagement with Stoicism in general, and 
Marcus Aurelius in particular, in his Enchiridion Ethicum. More quotes from 
Marcus’s Meditations throughout the Enchiridion, leading one commentator to 
note that More ‘mined the Meditations’ when writing his book. Yet More’s general 
attitude towards Stoicism is more often than not critical, especially when it 
comes to the passions. I shall argue that while More was clearly an avid reader of 
the Meditations he read Marcus not as a Stoic but as a ‘non-denominational’ 
ancient moralist who confirms a range of doctrines that More finds elsewhere in 
ancient philosophy. In this sense More continues the Neoplatonic practice of 
downplaying doctrinal differences between ancient philosophers in order to 
construct a single ancient philosophical tradition. This is quite different from the 
approach of his contemporary and fellow Cambridge Platonist, Ralph Cudworth, 
who was keen to highlight doctrinal differences between ancient philosophers.  
 
Henry More’s Enchiridion Ethicum, first published in 1668 and translated into 
English as An Account of Virtue in 1690,1 is rich in references to ancient 
philosophical authors. Among these Aristotle is probably the most prominent, 
but a casual reader of the work cannot help be struck by the frequency with 
which More quotes from or refers to the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius. Indeed, 
the frequency led one recent commentator to claim that More ‘mined the 
Meditations’ when writing the work.2 More was by no means alone in being 
captivated by the Meditations during this period. In 1634 Meric Casaubon 
translated the Meditations into English for the first time, coining the title by 
which it is usually known in the process, and he went on to produce an edition 																																																								
1 The Enchiridion Ethicum (hereafter abbreviated to EE) was first published in 1668 and reprinted 
in 1669, 1679 (in More’s Opera Omnia), and 1685. It was translated into English under the title An 
Account of Virtue (hereafter AV) in 1690, with a second edition in 1701. In what follows I rely on 
the first editions of each version. ‘EE 2.8.2’ refers to book 2, chapter 8, numbered section 2. For 
convenience I also include the pagination of AV. I have also consulted the version of EE printed 
in More’s Opera Omnia, which differs from the first edition at various points.  
2 See Brooke, Philosophic Pride, 110.  
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of the Greek text, published in 1643.3 At the same time Thomas Gataker, vicar of 
Rotherhithe, was preparing his own edition of the text with extensive 
commentary, which was published in Cambridge in 1652.4 It seems likely that 
More read Marcus in Gataker’s edition, which would have come out not long 
before the time More was composing the Enchiridion Ethicum.5 More is one of 
the earliest authors to refer extensively to the Meditations and so deserves a 
place in the history of the reception of Marcus Aurelius and, by extension, in the 
wider narrative of the reception of Stoicism.6  
In order to put what follows into that wider context, it may be helpful to 
say something about the reception of Stoicism up to the time that More was 
writing.7 In the Latin West, knowledge of Stoicism derived primarily from the 
works of Seneca and Cicero, both of whom were read widely during the Middle 
Ages and early Renaissance. Seneca was often regarded as the leading Stoic 
philosopher and, although a pagan, as a thinker not incompatible with Christian 
principles – a judgement shaped by St Jerome’s sympathetic attitude and by the 
																																																								
3 Casaubon’s 1634 translation, Marcus Aurelius Antoninus the Roman Emperor, his Meditations 
Concerning Himselfe, was reprinted in 1635, 1663, 1673, and 1692. His 1643 edition of the Greek 
text (with a facing Latin translation), Marci Antonini Imperatoris De Seipso Et Ad Seipsum libri 
XII, appears not to have been reprinted at all. See further Wickham Legg, ‘A Bibliography’, 26-7.  
4 Gataker’s 1652 edition, Marci Antonini Imperatoris de rebus suis, sive de eis qae [sic] ad se 
pertinere censebat, Libri XII, was reprinted in 1697 and 1707. See again Wickham Legg.  
5 More quotes from the Meditations using Gataker’s section numbering of the text. For example 
in EE 2.1.6 he cites Meditations 7.55; Casaubon’s Book 7 only has 47 sections, whereas Gataker’s 
Book 7 is divided into 75 sections. Modern editions (by e.g. Haines, Farquharson, Dalfen) all 
follow Gataker’s division of the text.  
6 There is no mention of More in Kraye, ‘“Ethnicorum omnium sanctissimus”’ (or in the later 
revised version, ‘Marcus Aurelius and Neostoicism in Early Modern Philosophy’).  
7 For general accounts of the reception of Stoicism see e.g. Spanneut, Permanence du Stoïcisme, 
Neymeyr, Schmidt, and Zimmermann, eds, Stoizismus, and, most recently, Sellars, ed., The 
Routledge Handbook of the Stoic Tradition. On the Renaissance reception briefly outlined here 
see Sellars ‘Stoicism’.  
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existence of a correspondence between Seneca and St Paul, which was only 
dismissed as spurious in the fifteenth century. 
The fifteenth century also saw the rediscovery of further sources for 
Stoicism, not least the Vitae philosophorum of Diogenes Laertius and the 
Enchiridion of Epictetus, although the latter was read through the lens of 
Simplicius’ Neoplatonic commentary. However Seneca remained a central point 
of reference throughout the sixteenth century and attracted the attention of 
Erasmus, Calvin, and Lipsius.8 The Dissertationes of Epictetus were first printed 
in 1535 and they too became an important point of reference in discussions of 
Stoicism, especially in the hands of Montaigne, Du Vair, and, a little later, Pascal.  
Marcus Aurelius, by contrast, barely figured in Renaissance discussions of 
Stoicism. Some excerpts from the Meditations did circulate in manuscript but 
Marcus only really found a wider readership after the relatively late editio 
princeps of the Meditations in 1559.9 The text, along with a translation into Latin 
by Xylander, was reprinted a number of times in the late sixteenth and early 
seventeenth centuries (1568, 1590, 1626), suggesting that it quickly became 
popular. That interest culminated in the mid-seventeenth century with the 
editions by Casaubon and Gataker mentioned earlier. 
The reception of the Meditations began quite late, then, and More was 
one of the first philosophers to draw on the work;10 Marcus Aurelius is rarely 
mentioned, if at all, by the so-called ‘Neostoic’ authors of the late sixteenth 																																																								
8 On the reception of Seneca in the sixteenth century, including ongoing debates regarding the 
authenticity of the correspondence with St Paul, see Kraye, ‘The Humanist as Moral 
Philosopher’.  
9 On the circulation of the Meditations in the Renaissance see Farquharson, The Meditations, xx-
xxviii.  
10 One of the few people to engage with Marcus before More was Jean Reuchlin (1455-1522) who, 
writing before the editio princeps of 1559, drew on a manuscript copy of the Meditations. See 
further Ceporina and Vesperini, ‘Quinze citations de Marc Aurèle dans Reuchlin’.  
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century.11 More was followed in the eighteenth century by figures such as the 
third Earl of Shaftesbury, who drew on the Meditations extensively in his 
Askêmata notebooks,12 and Francis Hutcheson, who translated the Meditations 
in collaboration with James Moor.13 Given that More was the first person to draw 
at any length on the Meditations, it seems worth examining in detail his use of 
Marcus Aurelius in his Enchiridion Ethicum. Do More’s frequent references to 
the Meditations indicate an interest in or debt to Stoicism? What else, if 
anything, does More have to say about Stoicism along the way? In what follows I 
shall examine More’s references to both Marcus Aurelius and other Stoic 
sources in order to try to answer these questions. I begin with his few passing 
references to ‘the Stoics’, then the slightly more frequent places where he refers 
to Epictetus, before turning to his far more numerous mentions of the 
Meditations. After having assessed the evidence I shall offer some conclusions 
about More’s use of Marcus Aurelius and his attitude towards Stoicism. As we 
shall see, these are largely negative. However I shall also comment on what all 
this tells us about More’s approach to the historiography of philosophy and how 
it differs from that of his fellow Cambridge Platonist Ralph Cudworth.  
 
1. More on Stoicism  
 
I begin by considering More’s very general references to the Stoics. There are 
only a handful of explicit references. At EE 1.3.6 (AV 16) More mentions the 																																																								
11 The label ‘Neostoic’ is a modern invention used to refer to a brand of Christianized Stoicism 
popular in the wake of Justus Lipsius. See further Lagrée, Le néostoïcisme.  
12 Recently re-edited for the ‘Standard Edition’ of Shaftesbury’s works in 2011 and reviewed in this 
journal, BJHP 21/3 (2013), 613-16.  
13 The translation was published anonymously in 1742; it has recently been re-edited in 
Hutcheson and Moor, The Meditations.  
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Stoics alongside Aristotle and the Pythagoreans as all being in agreement that to 
follow God means to follow Nature, which in turn means to follow right reason 
(recta ratio). A similar point is made at EE 2.3.3 (AV 106) where More cites 
Diogenes Laertius (7.88) on the Stoic view that there is a right reason pervading 
all things that is identified with God. More refers back to this passage a little 
later at EE 2.4.5 (AV 114). He refers to this idea as ‘from Zeno’ – that is, Zeno of 
Citium, founder of Stoicism – but by this it seems likely that he simply means 
from the ‘Life of Zeno’ in Diogenes Laertius, in which Diogenes included his 
general doxography of Stoic doctrine, so we ought not to place too much weight 
on the mention of Zeno himself. At EE 3.7.4 (AV 233) More mentions the Stoics 
alongside Socrates as proponents of the claim that wrongdoing is the product of 
ignorance. (This reference follows a quotation from Marcus although the 
connection between the two is not explicitly made.) In these passing references 
to the Stoics, then, More appears sympathetic, often citing them alongside and 
in agreement with other ancient philosophers whom he admires.  
Elsewhere, however, More is far less sympathetic. At EE 1.6.2 (AV 34) he 
opposes the Stoic claim that the passions are by their own nature bad: ‘we must 
maintain it against the Stoicks, that of their own Nature they [the passions] are 
good’.14 Further on, at EE 1.12.10 (AV 83), he insists again that the passions are by 
nature good and that the (Aristotelian) doctrine of moderated passions 
(metriopatheia) is much better than the Stoic doctrine of apatheia. His 
																																																								
14 I quote the English printed in AV. In fact this comment is not in the first edition of EE. It is 
however in the version of EE printed in More’s Opera Omnia II.1, 25: De quibus omnibus contra 
Stoicos statuendum est, quod sunt sua natura bonae. Evidently EE was revised by More between 
1668 and 1679. A quick glance at the second edition of 1669 reveals that this reference to the 
Stoics was already present then, so More must have revised the text almost immediately after 
first publication. Indeed, he revised it substantially: in the 1668 edition Book 1 has 8 chapters, 
while the 1669 edition is expanded to 13 chapters. All this highlights the need for a modern 
critical edition of the text.  
	 6 
argument, implicitly challenging the Stoics on their own ground, rests on the 
claim that the passions are themselves natural (see EE 1.12.1, AV 79), and so a life 
in accord with Nature will embrace the passions, at least in moderation. They 
offer useful guides to conduct when interpreted properly and are closely 
connected to virtue (EE 1.12.9, AV 83). Presumably he has in mind the way in 
which anger in the face of injustice is sometimes said to spur people on to 
intervene. In short, so long as the passions are not out of control, they can offer 
useful natural guides to behaviour. More concludes, ‘Surely this Temperament 
sounds better than what the Stoicks, and even some Platonists, do present us 
with’ (EE 1.12.10, AV 83).15  
Taking these sympathetic and critical references to the Stoics together, we 
can note the following: More is happy to refer to the Stoics when he can use 
them as another useful example of an ancient philosophical school that shares a 
widely held view he wants to defend; however he is far less well disposed to 
them when it comes to distinctively Stoic doctrines, such as their attitude 
towards the passions. Indeed, when it comes to distinctively Stoic views, such as 
the doctrine of apatheia, he is highly critical. Elsewhere in his works More refers 
to what he calls ‘sullen and inconsiderate Stoicism’.16 
 
 
 
 																																																								
15 This entire chapter is absent from the first edition of EE (see previous note). The Latin in the 
Opera Omnia II.1, 39 reads: Quae certe sunt multo aequiora atque humaniora quam quae reperias 
apud Stoicos & quosdam Platonicos.  
16 See Enthusiasmus Triumphatus § 59, as printed in More’s Opera Omnia II.2, 216: obstinatum 
inconsideratumque Stoicismum. The original English version published in 1656 does not mention 
the Stoics here. The English ‘sullen and inconsiderate Stoicism’ comes from Enthusiasm 
Explained of 1739 (‘Extracted from a Learned Piece of a late Eminent Writer’), 25.  
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2. More on Epictetus  
 
Given this hostility towards distinctively Stoic ideas it is perhaps striking, then, 
to find More citing from Stoic texts as often as he does. Marcus Aurelius 
dominates but he turns to Epictetus a number of times too. The bulk of these 
come from the Enchiridion although there is one reference to the 
Dissertationes.17 Most of these comprise of fairly generic moral advice rather 
than anything distinctively Stoic. At the risk of tediousness, I shall briefly run 
through all of the places that More draws on Epictetus in order to give a 
comprehensive overview of the evidence.  
At EE 1.3.5 (AV 15) More cites the Enchiridion (no reference given but in 
fact 51.2): do what appears to be best. At EE 2.3.7 (AV 108) he mentions the well-
known saying attributed to Epictetus by Aulus Gellius (Noctes Atticae 17.19), 
‘bear and forbear’.18 At EE 2.10.17 (AV 169) he cites Enchiridion 75 (i.e. 51.2) on 
fortitude in the face of present difficulties. Shortly after, in EE 2.10.19 (AV 171), 
More cites Ench. 79 (i.e. 53.3-4) where Epictetus quotes from Socrates in the 
Crito (43d) and the Apology (30c-d). These Socratic passages taken from 
Epictetus form the closing lines of More’s discussion of external goods, to which 
we shall return later.  
In EE 3.3-4 we find a cluster of references to Epictetus in quick succession. 
At 3.3.20 (AV 204) More cites Epictetus twice, the first unidentified, the second 
Enchiridion 75 (i.e. 51.2). These come after a similar quotation from Marcus. 																																																								
17 More’s references to the Enchiridion follow the divisions of the text used in the seventeenth 
century that divided it into 79 chapters. In 1741 John Upton introduced a new division of the text 
in 52 chapters and then in 1798 Johannes Schweighäuser subdivided one of these to generate the 
53 chapter division that has been used ever since. Here I provide More’s original reference 
followed by its equivalent in the current system.  
18 EE quotes the Greek anechou kai apechou; AV has it in Latin: sustine et abstine.  
	 8 
They all form part of a series of ‘rules’ that can guide us towards virtue: do not 
act rashly, do not act against what one thinks best, and so on. These are used as 
generic moral guidance rather than explicitly Stoic doctrines. At 3.3.23 (AV 205) 
Epictetus is mentioned alongside Plato and Marcus with reference to piety and 
here (AV 206) More cites Dissertationes 2.18 (i.e. 2.18.28-9): when battling with 
powerful impressions and passions always remember God and ‘call upon Him to 
help you and stand by your side’.19 More cites this as one in a list of classical 
quotations on the same point. Then in 3.4.2 (AV 209-10) he cites Enchiridion 35 
and 36 (i.e. 29.2 and 29.5) on the importance of considering both the nature of 
tasks being undertaken and one’s own nature, as examples of prudence. Finally, 
at EE 3.10.8 (AV 260) More cites one of the most famous lines in the Enchiridion 
(cap. 10; i.e. 5): people are disturbed not by things but by their judgements about 
things.  
Once again, most of More’s references to Epictetus are to generic moral 
advice rather than anything distinctively Stoic, notwithstanding the final 
famous quotation, which is sandwiched between a wide array of quotations 
from Cicero. As we can see most come from just a few sections of the 
Enchiridion (esp. chs 29, 51, 53) and so do not presuppose any deep familiarity 
with Epictetus’s work as a whole.  
 
3. More on Marcus Aurelius  
 
When we turn to Marcus Aurelius, however, the situation is quite different. 
More mentions or quotes from Marcus some 40 times. These references are 
focused in two places: towards the beginning of Book 2 (EE 2.1-4) and towards 																																																								
19 I quote from Oldfather’s translation of Epictetus; the version in AV reads ‘Wherefore think 
upon God, and call upon his Holy Aid and Assistance’.  
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the beginning of Book 3 (esp. EE 3.3). I shall not go through all of these 
references here; they are all listed in the Appendix below with a brief summary 
of their content and context. Instead, I shall pull out some of the common 
threads.  
More often cites Marcus as an authority for the view that one ought to act 
in accord with Reason and in obedience to God, and that these two amount to 
the same thing. Indeed they are also equivalent to the Stoic injunction to live in 
accord with Nature, understood in the sense of acting in accord with our own 
rational nature. Thus More cites Marcus’s statement in Meditations 7.11 that ‘to 
act according to Nature or according to Reason, is in a rational Creature the 
same thing’ (EE 1.2.4, AV 6).20 More goes on to identify this with acting according 
to virtue and locates both of these claims within a broadly Aristotelian 
discussion of pleasure (citing the Magna Moralia 2.7): pleasure is the product of 
a creature’s restitution to its own proper nature which, in the case of humans, is 
that of a naturally rational and virtuous animal. Marcus, then, is but one ancient 
authority among others for the point More wants to make.  
Later, in a discussion of the virtues, More again turns to Marcus for an 
identification between sacrifice to reason and sacrifice to God (EE 2.1.6, AV 95). 
This is one of a dozen or so references to Marcus occupying EE 2.1.5-10, among 
which More quotes Meditations 10.25:  
 
To obey the common Reason, that is in God; nay, which is little less 
than God himself. For he is the living Law, in whose Administration 
the whole Universe remains; and he who bestows on every Man, 
																																																								
20 Here and in what follows I quote from the translations of the Meditations in AV.  
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what he, in his Wisdom thinks fit and competent for him (EE 2.1.7, 
AV 95).  
 
This translation, from AV, is based on the Greek printed in EE, which reads: ho ta 
panta dioikôn theos nomos esti nemôn osa hekastôi epiballei. The relevant part of 
Meditations 10.25, as printed in both Gataker’s edition used by More and modern 
editions reads: ta panta dioikountos tetagmenôn, hos esti nomos nemôn, osa 
hekastôi epiballei. Marcus identifies law (nomos) as that which controls all 
things; he makes no mention of God. More has rewritten the text, inserting a 
reference to theos, to make it suit his purposes.  
After a couple of further quotations from Marcus (Meditations 8.52 and 
7.9) More sums up what he takes to have learned from him by saying, ‘Thus it is 
plainly his Sense, that one common Rule and Constitution runs through every 
intellectual Substance’ (EE 1.2.9, AV 96). Now this is not quite what Marcus says: 
in Meditations 7.9, which More quotes immediately beforehand, Marcus says 
that God permeates all things (theos heis dia pantôn), following standard Stoic 
doctrine. But More glosses this in a way to suit his own philosophical purposes. 
There is nothing wrong in this of course, but it does illustrate the fact that More 
is making use of Marcus for his own ends rather than paying close attention to 
the distinctively Stoic doctrines that we find in the Meditations.  
In a similar spirit More also quotes from Marcus on the topic of natural 
religion (Meditations 10.8) – ‘To remember God, and to know that he abhors all 
Hypocrisie, and will not be served but with what is rational and like to himself’ 
(EE 2.5.8, AV 121) – silently amending Marcus’s plural ‘Gods’ to the singular 
‘God’.21 As before, the letter of the text is less important than putting Marcus to 																																																								
21 Gataker’s edition of the Meditations prints to memnêsthai theôn (the parallel Latin translation 
reads meminisse Deorum), as do modern editions of the text. In the first edition of EE More 
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work in the service of More’s own philosophical project. More does the same at 
EE 3.9.18 (AV 251) when he quotes Marcus as saying ‘O thou vast and Beautiful 
Universe, created and supported by God, let every thing be delightful to me, that 
is pleasing and congruous to thy self’ (Meditations 4.23). Marcus does indeed 
address the universe (ô kosme) but the phrase ‘created and supported by God’ is 
More’s own addition.22 For Marcus the Stoic, of course, the universe is God 
rather than something created by God.23 Once again, More is indifferent to both 
the content and the letter of Marcus’s text, transforming it as he sees fit. He 
admires Marcus’s descriptions of the rationality and orderliness of the universe 
but rather than leave it at that he takes it upon himself to rewrite his quotations 
from the Meditations to make them more theological and to remove any traces 
of pantheism. While we should hardly be surprised by More’s philosophical 
preferences here, his disregard for the letter of Marcus’s text is somewhat 
surprising.  
Perhaps More had other motivations for reading Marcus; perhaps he was 
drawn more to his ethics than his natural theology. Indeed More regularly refers 
to Marcus when discussing specific virtues such as kindness, humility, piety, and 
prudence.24 Yet the overall impression is simply admiration for a nice turn of 
phrase that illustrates a feature More would like to highlight. Marcus is regularly 
praised for the clarity and quality of his ethical guidance (e.g. EE 2.8.16, AV 143) 																																																								
prints to memnêsthai theou; in the Opera Omnia version of EE (II.1, 51) this is translated into 
Latin as Meminisse Dei.  
22 In AV this is presented as part of the passage from the Meditations. In the text of EE printed in 
More’s Opera Omnia (II.1, 89) it is simply a gloss (prefaced with ‘i.e.’). It is absent in the first 
edition of EE.  
23 Strictly speaking the Stoic God is one of two corporeal principles that constitute the cosmos.  
24 See e.g. EE 2.8.16 (AV 143) citing Meditations 6.47; EE 2.8.20 (AV 145) citing Meditations 12.27; EE 
3.3.23 (AV 205); EE 3.4.2 (AV 209) citing Meditations 7.54 (not ‘2.54’ misprinted in AV) and 3.11 
respectively. Note also (on kindness) EE 3.7.4 (AV 233) citing Meditations 11.18.9 (not ‘10.18’ in EE 
or ‘1.18’ in AV),  
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but there is little in the way of close attention to the details of what he is saying. 
Marcus’s comments about the virtues function more as ornamentations rather 
than contributions to More’s extended account of the virtues.  
One feature that does pervade More’s use of Marcus is syncretism. We 
repeatedly see Marcus referred to alongside other ancient philosophers and 
presented as in agreement with them. For instance, in EE 2.1 More opens by 
distinguishing between three kinds of primitive virtues: prudence, sincerity, and 
patience. More wants to claim that this is a natural division rather than being 
arbitrary and so he wants to show that ancient thinkers came independently to 
the same division. He begins by referring to Pythagorean and Platonic examples 
– Metopus and the Pseudo-Platonic dialogue Theages. He then turns to Marcus, 
claiming that he too offers evidence for this division and is in agreement with 
the Pythagoreans and Platonists. In fact the text that More quotes, Meditations 
2.17, makes no such threefold distinction, although More does his best to read 
one into it.  
Further on More draws from Cicero’s De legibus for the notion of a law of 
nature and he notes that Cicero’s account agrees with earlier passages quoted 
from Marcus and (Diogenes Laertius’s life of) Zeno (EE 2.4.5, AV 114). Indeed, the 
relevant passage from the De legibus (2.4.8) was excerpted by Hans von Arnim as 
a Stoic testimonium (SVF 3.316). Immediately afterwards More expands on his 
rationale for these references to Stoic material: ‘all men do agree that the 
supreme law is right reason’ and this reason is a divine thing (EE 2.4.6, AV 114). 
More’s aim here, then, is not merely to show that all ancient philosophers agree 
on this point, but that all humankind agrees. This echoes the argumentative 
strategy in the last example: ancient philosophers, of which Marcus is but one, 
simply offer testimony for the universal truth of the moral claims More wants to 
make. A few pages later we find a similar case of syncretism, this time on the 
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nature of the soul. In EE 2.5.7 (AV 120) Mores cites Meditations 12.19, 8.2, and 5.27 
all on the divinity of the human soul, after similar quotes from Plato and Cicero 
to show general agreement on the topic. Any philosophical differences between 
Plato and Marcus are passed over in silence.  
More is also prepared to downplay the extent of the difference between 
Stoic and Aristotelian ethics. In so doing he stands within a long line of 
interpreters stretching back to Antiochus of Ascalon. In EE 2.10.3 (AV 161) he 
cites Meditations 7.67 during a discussion of the value of external goods. 
Following his broadly Aristotelian approach throughout the work as a whole, 
More asserts that some externals are genuine goods, although he qualifies this 
to suggest that many make little or no difference in comparison with virtue:  
 
Scarce do those things add unto Happiness while present, or 
retrench from it when absent; inasmuch as they hold no Proportion 
with complete and perfect Virtue.25  
 
It is at this point that he cites Marcus saying that a happy life requires very few 
things beyond virtue. This might suggest some sympathy with a moderate form 
of Stoicism; indeed straight after it is Aristotle who is said to agree with Marcus 
rather than the other way around. It is also worth noting that later in this 
chapter More cites Epictetus twice expressing indifference towards external 
situations (Ench. 75 (i.e. 51.2) and 79 (i.e. 53.3-4), discussed above). In the 
opening line of the next section, EE 3.1.1 (AV 172), More summarizes the 
preceding discussion by describing virtue as ‘the principal part of Happiness, if 																																																								
25 I quote the English version in AV 161. The Latin in EE 2.10.2 reads: Sic istiusmodi bonorum 
praesentia nihil fere addit, nec detrahit quicquam ipsorum absentia Beatitudinis perfectioni; 
quandoquidem cum Virtutis perfectione comparata nullam ad eam proportionem habere plane 
deprehenduntur.  
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not its full Perfection’ (Beatitudinis pars praecipua est, vel potius Summa). For 
More, then, the distance between Stoic and Peripatetic ethics on this issue is 
minimal, echoing Cicero’s famous statement that Zeno agreed in substance with 
Aristotle while differing only in words (see De finibus 4.72).  
One final example of syncretism touches on divine intelligence. In EE 
3.3.11 (AV 198) More cites Meditations 8.54 on the intelligence infusing all things. 
Marcus compares this ‘power of mind’ (hê noera dunamis) to the air we breathe, 
making both a point about its omnipresence and a nod to the formal Stoic 
theory of divine intelligence as pneuma pervading all things. More cites Marcus 
here alongside Plato and the Neoplatonist Hierocles, seemingly unconcerned by 
the quite different metaphysical theories underpinning the views of these 
authors. Marcus has been co-opted to support a Platonist project alien to his 
own philosophical commitment to immanent pantheism.  
Lastly, there are places where More cites Marcus for his own purposes, 
taking him out of context altogether. In particular we might note EE 3.1.8 (AV 
177) where More mentions Marcus and (in EE, not reproduced in AV) quotes 
without reference the word neurospastos (from either Meditations 6.28 or 7.29): 
a puppet controlled by the emotions.26 More is following Marcus in saying that 
we ought to avoid becoming a mere puppet and instead exercise self-control. 
But the context in which this reference is made is striking. Having argued for the 
centrality of virtue in the pursuit of happiness, More now argues in favour of 
free will, without which he says ‘all Exhortation to Virtue seems but in vain’ (EE 
3.1.2, AV 172). His explicit target is Hobbes’s account of necessity. More counters 
this by asserting the existence of a free will that he defines as ‘a Power to Act or 
not Act within our selves’ (EE 3.1.8, AV 176). However he also acknowledges that 																																																								
26 On this notion in Marcus Aurelius see Berryman, ‘The Puppet and the Sage’.  
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a virtuous person will inevitably act virtuously, unable, for instance, to commit 
acts of injustice against the innocent. Although the virtuous person has the 
ability to commit such acts, by his nature he will be unable to will them. There is 
of course much in Stoicism that overlaps with More’s philosophical concerns 
here, along with a number of points of contact with Cudworth’s reflections on 
free will that engage explicitly with Stoicism.27 But More pays scant attention to 
any of that or to the wider context of Marcus’s comment. He simply likes the 
image he finds in the Meditations and borrows it for a different end.  
 
4. More’s Use of Stoicism  
 
Despite his extensive references to and quotations from Marcus Aurelius and, to 
a lesser extent, Epictetus, More pays limited attention to specifically Stoic 
doctrines. On the few occasions where he does, he tends to be critical. This may 
have been deliberate misdirection, aimed at distancing More from Stoicism.28 
Whatever doubts More may have had about, for instance, the Stoic attitude 
towards the passions, he nevertheless shared with them the view that reason 
can and ought to be a guide for living. That view attracted strong criticism in 
theological circles, both Calvinist and Augustinian. Writing just a decade or so 
before More, Pascal had attacked the Stoicism of Epictetus as ‘wickedly proud’ 
for suggesting that reason alone, without divine grace, could lead to a happy 
																																																								
27 Cudworth’s material on free will was intended to become the third part of The True Intellectual 
System but was never published. It survives in a series of manuscripts now in the British Library 
(BL Addit. 4978-82), one of which (4978) was published posthumously in 1838 as A Treatise of 
Freewill. On Cudworth’s engagement with Stoicism in this text see Sellars, ‘Stoics Against Stoics 
in Cudworth’s A Treatise of Freewill’.  
28 I thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.  
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life.29 Calvin had been equally critical of Stoicism in the realm of ethics; when it 
came to issues surrounding fate, he repeatedly tried to distance himself from 
Stoicism in order to undermine the accusation he was himself a Stoic.30 Was 
More doing something similar himself? I am inclined to doubt it, because the 
same charge would equally apply to the other ancient philosophies that More 
openly embraced. His critical comments directed towards certain Stoic 
doctrines in the Enchiridion Ethicum appear within the context of a debate 
between ancient philosophical schools with little regard for contemporary 
theological disputes (even if those debates preoccupied him elsewhere). At the 
same time, More was happy to use Stoic material from Marcus Aurelius where it 
could be cited as simply another example of an ancient author who agreed with 
a view that More wanted to show is universally held by respected authorities. 
More certainly read his Meditations but he made little philosophical use of what 
he found there, either constructively or critically.  
 
5. More’s Historiography of Philosophy  
 
Although the conclusion regarding More’s use of Stoicism is largely negative – 
both in terms of the extent of his philosophical use of Stoicism and the quality 
of his scholarship – there are other conclusions we can draw from examining his 
references to Stoic texts. As we have seen, More’s approach to Marcus Aurelius 
was often shaped by syncretism. In this he followed a well established approach 
to ancient philosophy dating back ultimately to Antiochus who, as reported in 
Cicero’s philosophical works, downplayed the differences between Academics, 
																																																								
29 See Pascal’s Entretien avec M. de Saci (Oeuvres complètes, 560-74, esp. 563).  
30 On these two points see Pitkin, ‘Erasmus, Calvin, and the Faces of Stoicism’, 150-54.  
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Peripatetics, and Stoics, and in the process laid the foundations for the 
syncretism of late ancient Platonism.31 That approach was taken up much later 
by Florentine Platonists such as Marsilio Ficino who proposed a single, unified 
tradition of speculative thought.32 More’s own approach to the historiography of 
ancient philosophy stands within this tradition. For a precursor treating a 
Roman Stoic text in this manner we might point to Simplicius’s commentary on 
the Enchiridion of Epictetus, in which Simplicius co-opts Epictetus’s short text 
into the Neoplatonic educational curriculum by downplaying its explicit Stoic 
content and treating it as a source of generic moral guidance. Simplicius’s 
approach to Epictetus was admired by Angelo Poliziano (closely associated with 
the Florentine Platonists) and drawn on by the Cambridge Platonist John 
Smith.33 More’s use of Marcus Aurelius takes a broadly similar approach.  
This is in marked contrast to the approach to the history of ancient 
philosophy adopted by his fellow Cambridge Platonist Ralph Cudworth,34 whose 
modus operandi in The True Intellectual System was to distinguish sharply 
between different ancient philosophical schools and even to note disputes 
within schools, such as debates within the Stoa.35 From our perspective it is 																																																								
31 See Sedley, The Philosophy of Antiochus, 80-103, for Antiochus’s role as historian of philosophy 
and 334-46 for the ancient evidence for his views. On the subsequent development of this 
approach see Karamanolis, Plato and Aristotle in Agreement?  
32 See further Santinello, Models of the History of Philosophy, 14-25.  
33 For the reception of Simplicius’s commentary see Hadot, ‘La survie du commentaire de 
Simplicius’, discussing both Poliziano and Smith.  
34 Hall, in his Henry More, 71, comments that Cudworth’s approach ‘paralleled that of his friend 
Henry More’ (although Hall qualifies this by saying that he makes ‘no pretence here of 
examining Cudworth’s possible role as an historian of philosophy’). By contrast, Santinello, 
Models of the History of Philosophy, 282-5, highlights the differences between the approaches of 
More and Cudworth, especially with reference to their focus on the occult and scholarship 
respectively.  
35 See Sellars, ‘Is God a Mindless Vegetable?’ on Cudworth’s approach to the history of 
philosophy and, 131, his attention to disputes within the Stoa.  
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tempting to say that Cudworth’s fine-grained scholarship pre-empts subsequent 
developments in the historiography of philosophy while More’s approach harks 
back to an ancient model that was increasingly out of fashion.36  
This contrast between a progressive Cudworth and a traditionalist More 
also helps to bring into focus their differing approaches to Stoicism. During the 
course of the seventeenth century the Stoics underwent a dramatic 
transformation in public image. At the end of the sixteenth century it was not 
uncommon for readers of the later Roman Stoics to present Stoicism as a 
natural ally of Christianity. Thomas James, the first Librarian at the Bodleian in 
Oxford, wrote in 1598 that ‘no kinde of philosophie is more profitable and nearer 
approaching unto Christianitie […] than the philosophie of the Stoicks’.37 By the 
early eighteenth century, however, the Stoics were being attacked in some 
quarters as atheists and the Spinozists of antiquity.38 The reason for this change 
of image was a shift of attention away from the works of Seneca and Epictetus 
and a new focus on the doxographical evidence for the early Stoics Zeno and 
Chrysippus. This in turn led to significantly greater attention being paid to Stoic 
physics, and many readers did not like what they found. More was himself one 
of those readers. In his The Immortality of the Soul of 1659 More made one of his 
few other remarks about Stoicism:  
 
But how coursly the Stoicks Philosophize when they are once 
turned out of their rode-way of moral Sentences, any one but 																																																								
36 More’s traditionalism here, if we can call it that, may in part simply reflect the fact that he was 
writing a textbook rather than attempting to offer anything radically new. I thank an 
anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.  
37 This comes from James’s preface to his translation of Guillaume Du Vair, The Moral 
Philosophie of the Stoicks, 45.  
38 See further Brooke, Philosophic Pride, 127-48, and Sellars, ‘Is God a Mindless Vegetable?’.  
	 19 
moderately skilled in Nature and Metaphysicks may easily discern. 
For what Errors can be more gross then those that they entertain of 
God, of the Soul, and of the Stars, they making the two former 
Corporeal Substances [...].39 
 
The context of this remark is a discussion about the Stoic doctrine of eternal 
recurrence. Here More displays the critical attitude towards Stoicism that we 
also find in Cudworth and later critics such as Johann Franz Buddeus. But his 
use of Marcus Aurelius in the Enchiridion Ethicum is quite different in character. 
There he is happy to draw on the ‘moral Sentences’ of the Emperor, indifferent 
to or unaware of what he elsewhere took to be the unpalatable features of Stoic 
physics. His main aim was to try to show a wide consensus among ancient 
philosophers for a number of foundational ethical claims, and Marcus is just one 
more source for this among many. Marcus’s Stoic credentials seem irrelevant 
and count neither for nor against him in the Enchiridion Ethicum. More’s 
approach to Marcus, then, was also increasingly out of fashion, despite the fact 
that he was one of the first people to quote from the Meditations extensively. 
Subsequent readers of the Meditations, most notably Shaftesbury and 
Hutcheson, took Marcus’s Stoicism, and indeed Stoicism as a whole, far more 
seriously.40  
 
 
 
																																																								
39 More, The Immortality of the Soul (1659), 3.18.12, p. 534 (cf. Immortalitas Animae, in Opera 
Omnia II.2, p. 454).  
40 Both Shaftesbury and Hutcheson are discussed in relation to Stoicism in Maurer, ‘Stoicism and 
the Scottish Enlightenment’.  
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Appendix: References to Marcus Aurelius in More’s Enchiridion Ethicum  
 
1. EE 1.2.4 (AV 6) cites Med. 7.11: to act in accord with nature is the 
same as acting in accord with reason (for a rational creature).  
2. EE 2.1.5 (AV 94) cites Med. 2.17: Marcus offers a definition of 
philosophy, which More presents as an account of three types of 
virtue.  
3-6. EE 2.1.6 (AV 94-5) cites Med. 7.55, then two unidentified passages 
followed by a reference to Med. 8.26: we have a duty to mankind 
and we ought to submit to God.  
7-8. EE 2.1.7 (AV 95) cites Med. 10.8 and then 10.25 on both the divisions 
of virtue and obedience to God.  
9-13. EE 2.1.8 (AV 96) cites from Med. 8.52 and 7.9; 2.1.9 (AV 96) cites Med. 
2.4.4 and 12.23; 2.1.10 (AV 97) cites Med. 10.8. More cites Marcus 
seemingly for his ability to make a point with a striking phrase, 
rather than for anything philosophically distinctive.  
14. EE 2.2.3 (AV 99) cites without reference Med. 8.51: the prudent man 
is master of his affections, used to make an un-Stoic point.  
15. EE 2.3.1 (AV 104) cites Med. 12.29 on definition of perfection of soul.  
16-17. EE 2.3.2 (AV 105) cites Med. 10.1 and 4.26 on simplicity of the soul.  
18. EE 2.3.4 (AV 106) cites Med. 8.54 on unity with God, following after a 
Stoic quote from Diogenes Laertius (7.88).  
19. EE 2.3.8 (AV 108) cites Med. 7.29 taken somewhat out of context.  
20. EE 2.4.5 (AV 114) refers back to earlier mentions of Marcus and Zeno 
when quoting from Cicero’s De legibus 2.4.8.  
21. EE 2.4.6 (AV 115) a passing mention of Marcus.  
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22-24. EE 2.5.7 (AV 120) cites Med. 12.19, 8.2, and 5.27 all on the divinity of 
the human soul, after similar quotes from Plato and Cicero.  
25-26. EE 2.5.8 (AV 121) cites Med. 10[.8] and 6.7, silently changing a 
reference to ‘the gods’ to one to ‘God’.  
27. EE 2.8.16 (AV 143) cites Med. 6.47, a general comment on the virtue 
of lenity/kindness (eumenes).  
28. EE 2.8.20 (AV 145) cites Med. 12.27 on the virtue of humility.  
29. EE 2.10.3 (AV 161) cites Med. 7.67 in a discussion of the value of 
external goods.  
30. EE 3.1.8 (AV 177) mentions Marcus and (in EE; not reproduced in 
AV) quotes neurospastos (from either Med. 6.28 or 7.29), a puppet 
controlled by the emotions.  
31. EE 3.3.10 (AV 197) paraphrases Marcus, probably Med. 8.54, ‘that 
Intellectual Spirit, which replenishes every Thing’.  
32. EE 3.3.11 (AV 198) cites Med. 8.54 on intelligence infusing all things, 
alongside Plato.  
33. EE 3.3.17 (AV 202) mentions, but does not cite, Marcus.  
34. EE 3.3.19 (AV 204) cites an unidentified passage from Marcus as a 
rule to guide us: ‘that we never meddle with any thing rashly’, 
followed by two passages from Epictetus (one unidentified, the 
other Ench. 51.2) also cited as rules.  
35. EE 3.3.23 (AV 205) mentions Marcus with reference to piety.  
36-37. EE 3.4.2 (AV 209) cites Med. 7.54 (not ‘2.54’ misprinted in AV) and 
3.11 as examples of prudence, followed by further examples from 
Epictetus (Ench. 29.2 and 29.5).  
38. EE 3.7.4 (AV 233) cites Med. 11.18.9 (not ‘10.18’ in EE or ‘1.18’ in AV) on 
the virtue of lenity/kindness (eumenes).  
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39. EE 3.9.12 (AV 248) cites Med. 11.15 (not ‘10.15’) on bodily expressions 
of virtue.  
40. EE 3.9.18 (AV 251) cites Med. 4.23 on harmony with Nature.  
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